
Global Drone Surveys

PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION / NOVEMBER 2026

COUNTER-UAS OPERATIONAL ASSURANCE

STADIUM SECURITY ASSESSMENT / FICTIONAL CASE STUDY



ASSESSMENT RECORD

NORTHBRIDGE ARENA

A comprehensive example of the scope, methodology, simulated operational data, findings and management decisions available from a professionally governed Counter-UAS assurance engagement.

DOCUMENT STATUS

FICTIONAL VENUE / ILLUSTRATIVE RESULTS

GDS-CUAS-DEMO-001 / VERSION 1.1

DOCUMENT PURPOSE

ORIENTATION

What this example demonstrates

A public specimen showing the standard of evidence-led analysis and reporting envisaged for an authorised Counter-UAS assurance engagement.

READ FIRST

This is a demonstration document. Northbridge Arena, all scenario records, numerical examples, observations, ratings and management recommendations are fictional. They are not evidence of an actual GDS stadium assessment.

WHY A CLIENT COMMISSIONS THIS

Independent evidence rather than a product demonstration

The value lies in assessing whether technology, the people using it and the management processes supporting it perform together. The intended output is an accountable decision record: what worked, what remains uncertain, what should improve and how management can verify completion.

01

Assurance question

Is the protective capability achieving the agreed operational objectives?

02

Evidence question

Can each conclusion be traced to a defined test, observation or document?

03

Management question

Who owns corrective actions, and how will improvement be verified?

HOW TO READ

Two layers of reporting

This public example uses a management-facing core report with carefully sanitised technical summaries. A real engagement could include restricted supporting annexes for authorised recipients, subject to contractual terms, lawful test scope and information-handling controls.

PUBLICATION BOUNDARY

All diagrams are conceptual and do not represent an actual stadium footprint or protective-system configuration.

Use this report to judge the structure, rigour and clarity of the proposed deliverable, not to infer proven GDS case history.

DOCUMENT CONTROL

GOVERNANCE

Issue register and distribution

Versioned document control ensures that a decision-maker can identify the status, ownership and intended use of the report.

CONTROL FIELD	RECORDED VALUE
Document reference	GDS-CUAS-DEMO-001
Report title	Counter-UAS Operational Assurance / Stadium Security Assessment
Illustrative client	Northbridge Arena (fictional venue)
Report version	1.1 / Public demonstration (expanded data exhibits)
Issue date	21 November 2026
Classification	PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION - ILLUSTRATIVE
Document author	Global Drone Surveys / demonstration concept
Distribution	Public website preview; no controlled client data
Authorisation	Not a commissioned engagement; no genuine sign-off asserted

CONTROLLED-REPORT CONVENTION

How an actual client issue would differ

A genuine assessment should specify the client-defined information classification, named accountable approver, restricted recipient register, evidence retention schedule, review history and any separate technical annex. Distribution must reflect contractual and site-specific requirements.

Document integrity: a client report should maintain a single approved master, a change register and a verified relationship between findings, evidence references and management actions.

CONTENTS

INDEX

Report navigation

Detailed management analysis, followed by illustrative technical evidence and traceability appendices.

01	Executive brief	05-07
02	Venue and assessment scope	08-09
03	Methodology and governance	10-13
04	Assessment results	14-17
05	Positive findings	18
06	Findings and detailed analysis	19-23
07	Risk and recommendations	24-27
08	Safe delivery and assurance cycle	28-29
09	Management conclusion	30
10	Annexes and references	31-33
11	Synthetic data & response exhibits	34-37

Reading route: pages 05-07 establish the judgement; pages 14-17 give outcome measures; pages 34-37 show detailed synthetic records and limits of airborne-response assessment.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE BRIEF

Assessment judgement

Fictional worked example / management-level narrative. No real stadium, client or test activity is represented.

ALL RESULTS ILLUSTRATIVE

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

A credible baseline with procedural gaps

The hypothetical venue operates an established Counter-UAS protective-security process with defined leadership ownership, documented incident response procedures and an integrated alert-receipt pathway. In the illustrative exercise records, initial alert presentation functioned consistently; however, the evidence shows less consistent acknowledgement logging, cross-team handover and incident-closeout documentation.

CORE JUDGEMENT

The principal improvement need is not assumed to be a technology replacement. It is the establishment of repeatable, measurable and documented operational handling from detection through management decision and review.

BALANCED FINDINGS

What worked / what needs strengthening

Established good practice

Clear senior ownership, effective authorisation discipline, workable alert presentation and cooperative multi-team participation.

Priority improvement areas

Clarify acknowledgement ownership, standardise incident handover records and ensure decisions are traceable in the case file.

FINDINGS AT A GLANCE

The report records 10 illustrative improvement findings: 2 high, 6 medium, 2 low. No critical finding is asserted.

Management should treat the figures as examples of reporting presentation, not as an assessment or security rating of any real venue.

ASSURANCE DASHBOARD

EXECUTIVE BRIEF

Illustrative outcome measures


Synthetic management measures from eight controlled records and four tabletop exercises. Pages 34-37 contain the corresponding example event register, plots and decision-assurance record.

ALL RESULTS ILLUSTRATIVE

CONTROLLED SCENARIO RECORDS	DECISION-SUPPORT EXERCISES	IMPROVEMENT FINDINGS
08	04	10
authorised validation events	tabletop / coordination records	2 high / 6 medium / 2 low

ASSESSMENT INDICATORS

The distinction between alert and action



HOW TO INTERPRET THE DATA

The fractions describe completeness against the fictional exercise records, not a system detection probability or guarantee of field performance.

Numbers must be read alongside the criteria, exclusions and sample size. Comparisons between venues would require a standardised, agreed methodology.

MANAGEMENT PRIORITIES

EXECUTIVE BRIEF

Four decisions for the client

A consultant-grade report should help the commissioning organisation decide what to fund, who will act and what assurance it should expect.

01

Confirm process ownership

Approve a single accountable operational owner for the full alert-to-decision record.

ACCOUNTABLE: SENIOR SECURITY OWNER

02

Standardise handover

Adopt a common information minimum for response transitions and event closeout.

ACCOUNTABLE: SECURITY OPERATIONS

03

Strengthen training proof

Link briefings, exercises and evidence of competency to current procedures.

ACCOUNTABLE: TRAINING / ASSURANCE

04

Commission targeted retest

Verify completion against the original assessment criteria rather than relying on self-certification.

ACCOUNTABLE: INDEPENDENT ASSESSOR

The four decisions are representative of the kind of board-actionable direction a genuine client should expect. Implementation windows and resource requirements must be agreed against the client's operational calendar.

FICTIONAL VENUE

VENUE CONTEXT

Northbridge Arena

A generic multi-use stadium serves as the context for this specimen. There is no real site map or protected-location data.



VENUE IMAGE

Photograph supplied by GDS for illustrative presentation. This is not Northbridge Arena and does not document a real Counter-UAS engagement.

Northbridge Arena
Fictional multi-use UK venue
No real security architecture or site layout reproduced

OPERATING CONTEXT

Commercially relevant characteristics

ATTRIBUTE	ILLUSTRATIVE PROFILE
Venue role	Professional sport, concerts and major public events
Site management	Permanent security function and central event control
Protective arrangements	Existing UAS alerting process and management procedures
Stakeholder model	Venue security, operations, technical owner and external liaison
Operating conditions	Variable event schedules and temporary operational arrangements
Report scope	Detection-to-decision process and evidence management

The photograph is illustrative only and does not depict Northbridge Arena. The assessment excludes real installation positions, approach paths and restricted access information.

ASSESSMENT SCOPE

SCOPE

Objectives, boundaries and exclusions

Scope control is fundamental to both the evidential value and the lawful delivery of a sensitive-site assurance exercise.

OBJECTIVES

Questions the client needs answered

OBJECTIVE
O1

Does the nominated alert reach the appropriate operational recipient?

OBJECTIVE
O2

Can personnel recognise, acknowledge and classify the information?

OBJECTIVE
O3

Are responsibilities and escalation decisions understood?

OBJECTIVE
O4

Is the recorded evidence sufficient for later management review?

IN SCOPE

Operational assurance domains

- Procedure ownership and version control
- Alert presentation, acknowledgment and information handling
- Operational roles, coordination and decision logging
- Evidence retention, improvement governance and retesting provisions

OUT OF SCOPE

Explicit exclusions

No public-event disruption, unlawful spectrum interference, unauthorised access, active countermeasure operation, system circumvention, protected-site disclosure or claims of accredited certification are included. The fictional exercise uses only broad representative scenario categories.

ASSESSMENT METHOD

METHODOLOGY

A six-phase assurance cycle

A controlled, repeatable method is more defensible than a demonstration that simply produces attractive imagery or a pass/fail headline.

01

DEFINE

Objectives and success criteria

02

AUTHORISE

Permissions and safe boundaries

03

VALIDATE

Approved representative exercises

04

EVALUATE

Evidence and findings review

05

REPORT

Decisions and corrective actions

06

RETEST

Independent confirmation of change

ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLE

Independent triangulation of evidence

For each conclusion, the assessor should seek at least one objective record, an observed operational behaviour and a relevant procedure or acceptance criterion. Where the evidence conflicts, the report should describe the uncertainty instead of promoting a convenient rating.

Quality gate: findings are only issued when the supporting evidence is recorded, the test condition is understood and the inference is proportionate to the available information.

AUTHORISATION & SAFETY

GOVERNANCE

Controlled delivery boundaries

A sensitive-site assessment must be designed around lawful authorisation, site safety and information governance before any live testing.

01
Accountable authority

Written confirmation of commissioning power, scope and authorised activity.

02
Aviation permissions

Operational authorisation and airspace conditions appropriate to the actual flight.

03
Site integration

Coordinated test window, affected stakeholders, hold points and communication ownership.

04
Public protection

Risk-managed environment and procedures to prevent unplanned public exposure.

05
Stop-work authority

Named right to pause or terminate for any deviation or unexpected hazard.

06
Evidence security

Agreed data custody, restricted circulation and secure deletion or return.

BOUNDARY NOTE

No implied authority to use effectors

Testing a detection and response workflow does not itself authorise interference, interception or other regulated countermeasure actions. Any such activity would require separate legal analysis and relevant permissions.

ILLUSTRATIVE PROGRAMME

ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME

Representative exercise categories

Eight controlled validation records and four facilitated coordination exercises provide the fictional evidence sample.

ALL RESULTS ILLUSTRATIVE

REF	CATEGORY	ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVE	RECORD TYPE
CV-01-04	Controlled event validation	Alert receipt, categorisation and acknowledgement	Event register
CV-05-08	Controlled workflow validation	Decision record, evidence custody and closeout	Observation log
TX-01	Command exercise	Roles, responsibilities and escalation	Facilitator note
TX-02	Cross-team coordination	Information transfer and decision traceability	Decision log
TX-03	Event-day preparedness	Procedure interpretation under representative workload	Exercise worksheet
TX-04	Management debrief	Learning capture and corrective-action ownership	Debrief record

CONTROLLED CONSTRAINTS

How the example is intentionally sanitised

No scenario record includes navigation instructions, sensor locations, frequencies, exploitable timing information or security bypass methods. A genuine programme requires written authority, agreed success criteria and a separate restricted operational plan.

ASSESSMENT RULES

EVALUATION CRITERIA

What constitutes sufficient evidence?

Clear acceptance criteria prevent subjective interpretations from becoming unsupported performance claims.

DOMAIN	ILLUSTRATIVE CRITERION	EVIDENCE REQUIRED
Alert presentation	Alert visible in the designated interface during the recorded exercise.	Time-aligned event record and observer note
Acknowledgement	Responsible operator confirms receipt within the client-agreed criterion.	System record or contemporaneous log
Decision handling	Case is evaluated with a clear decision and accountable role.	Case record and procedure reference
Escalation	Relevant cases show recorded handover and responsible recipient.	Escalation and contact record
Evidence control	Associated records are indexed, retained and appropriately controlled.	Evidence register and custody note
Learning closure	Agreed action has owner, time frame and verification method.	CAPA record and sign-off evidence

INTERPRETATION

A missing record is not automatically a system failure

A test may demonstrate that an alert was received while leaving insufficient evidence that a specific decision occurred. Findings should distinguish technical behaviour, process compliance and uncertainty. This prevents an unwarranted claim about device performance or operator conduct.

RESULTS AT A GLANCE

Illustrative operational results


Example output of a controlled test register. The fictional measures are selected to explain assurance reporting, not to characterise any real system.

ALL RESULTS ILLUSTRATIVE




Alert presented

8 of 8 fictional records meet the selected example criterion.




Acknowledgement recorded

6 of 8 fictional records meet the selected example criterion.



Decision entry complete

5 of 8 fictional records meet the selected example criterion.



Evidence indexed

7 of 8 fictional records meet the selected example criterion.

DISCUSSION

The gap is primarily in information continuity

The illustrative eight-record exercise shows consistent initial alert presentation (8/8), weaker acknowledgement evidence (6/8) and only five complete management decisions (5/8). This pattern may indicate an operational process-assurance need. It does not, by itself, demonstrate an exploitable defect or prove that a counter-drone system would fail in an actual incident.

Source: fictitious exercise record series CV-01 to CV-08. No real system data or sensor specifications have been used.

DETECTION & ALERTING

RESULTS

From signal to usable information

The assessment follows the management use of an alert and avoids drawing performance conclusions outside the available evidence.

01 Event record > 02 Alert display > 03 Acknowledge > 04 Classify > 05 Decision log

OBSERVATIONS

What the sample results support

All eight example records show the agreed initial alert presentation outcome. Six contain acknowledgement evidence meeting the fictional acceptance criterion, and five contain the completed associated decision record. The reporting distinction is deliberate: an alert in a technical system does not equal a documented organisational response.

Good practice

Alert presentation is assigned to a known interface and linked to a named operational function. This creates a viable foundation for auditability.

Improvement opportunity

Introduce a mandatory acknowledgement owner, a concise escalation checklist and a standard case-closeout field set.

ASSURANCE LIMIT

What this cannot establish

These controlled example outcomes are not a statistical detection probability. No conclusion is made about flight range, technical coverage or adversarial exploitability. No active airborne mitigation was conducted or assessed; response governance was evaluated separately by tabletop exercise.

OPERATIONAL RESPONSE

RESULTS

People, procedure and decision quality

The synthetic evidence shows a strong initial alert route, weaker decision records and uncertainty about who can authorise lawful airborne response. No physical drone countermeasure or interference was trialled.

01

Command ownership

The fictional operations lead is clearly nominated, although deputy arrangements merit periodic review.

02

Operational handover

Two example exercises show incomplete records of who accepted responsibility after an alert.

03

Documented judgement

Some case files record an action but not the rationale or relevant decision-maker.

04

Debrief and learning

Lessons are discussed, but closure evidence is not consistently linked to the initial exercise.

WORKED EXAMPLE

Scenario TX-02: coordination record quality

During a fictional facilitated coordination exercise, the initial alert and team discussion are documented. The handover record does not consistently show the receiving function, decision time and closure reference. The issue is classified as an evidence and procedural weakness, not a failure of the underlying detection equipment.

Recommended response: adopt a common handover template, rehearse roles at briefing and conduct a targeted evidence-quality review during the next authorised exercise.

EVIDENCE ASSURANCE

RESULTS

Traceability and controlled reporting

A defensible report should allow an authorised reviewer to follow every material conclusion back to the records that support it.

EVIDENCE CHAIN

From source to management action

01
Capture
Approved source event and observer record

02
Validate
Time correlation and completeness check

03
Assess
Finding and criteria cross-reference

04
Assign
Accountable owner and corrective action

05
Verify
Retest or documentary closure proof

EVIDENCE QUALITY

Two tests for every finding

Authenticity: can the assessor establish provenance, version, collection authority and relevance? Sufficiency: does the evidence support the actual conclusion, including any stated limitations? In the demonstration, the assessor records uncertainty where documentary or observational proof is incomplete.

EVIDENCE ID	SOURCE	CHECK	STATUS
E-CV-01	Exercise event log	Cross-referenced	Accepted
E-CV-02	Acknowledgement record	Partial field set	Qualified
E-TX-02	Facilitator observation	Observed / recorded	Accepted
E-GOV-01	Current procedure	Version confirmed	Accepted

Real evidence metadata and sensitive material would be subject to a separate access-controlled register, not automatically included in the public report.

POSITIVE FINDINGS

FINDINGS

Good practice is a finding, too

Security assurance should recognise working controls and explain how the client can maintain them.

GP-01

Established executive sponsor

Illustrative evidence: The fictional venue has an identified senior sponsor for protective-security readiness.

Sustain: Maintain formal quarterly review and retain action accountability.

GP-02

Defined operational alert channel

Illustrative evidence: The initial notification pathway has named operational recipients and evidence of use.

Sustain: Include the channel in planned continuity exercises.

GP-03

Controlled safety planning

Illustrative evidence: The demonstration assumes written exercise approval, a defined test boundary and stop authority.

Sustain: Apply a common pre-test authorisation checklist.

GP-04

Cooperative cross-team engagement

Illustrative evidence: Security, operations and technical owners participate in the sample review and debrief.

Sustain: Embed cross-functional representation in recurring assurance.

FINDINGS REGISTER

Issue catalogue / part one

Two high-priority and three medium-priority example issues. All descriptions are sanitised and fictional.

REF	ISSUE	PRIORITY	MANAGEMENT CONSEQUENCE / ACTION
F-01	Acknowledgement ownership	HIGH	Responsibility may become ambiguous at shift boundaries. Assign explicit ownership and backup.
F-02	Handover documentation	HIGH	Decision provenance can be lost between teams. Introduce one shared information standard.
F-03	Debrief action closure	MEDIUM	Improvements may be discussed but not verified. Require action IDs and closure proof.
F-04	Evidence retention ownership	MEDIUM	Records may be archived inconsistently. Establish named custodian and retention rules.
F-05	Training proof and refresh	MEDIUM	Procedure currency may be difficult to demonstrate. Link training records to current SOP versions.

CLASSIFICATION NOTE

A priority rating is assigned for client action planning using a declared qualitative model, not a standardised counter-drone certification scale.

Detailed technical records, if produced, would remain accessible only to authorised recipients and are not part of this public example.

FINDINGS REGISTER

FINDINGS

Issue catalogue / part two

Three medium-priority and two low-priority fictional issues, completing the ten-entry improvement register.

REF	ISSUE	PRIORITY	MANAGEMENT CONSEQUENCE / ACTION
F-06	Procedure change control	MEDIUM	Operating instructions could diverge from current roles. Define review and release authority.
F-07	Technical / operations liaison	MEDIUM	Service checks may not inform the duty manager. Agree reporting and exception escalation.
F-08	Incident closeout format	LOW	Debrief record is less consistent. Use a concise common closeout template.
F-09	Exercise learning register	LOW	Training themes are less visible over time. Consolidate and track lessons.
F-10	Management trend reporting	MEDIUM	Leadership receives isolated observations. Introduce periodic themes and completion status.

READING THE REGISTER

The register is intentionally biased towards governance and process quality; it does not provide a real site's weaknesses, sensor blind spots or exploitable technical details.

The next pages show how a high-priority finding becomes a traceable, costable and independently verifiable corrective action.

F-01

DETAILED FINDINGS

Acknowledgement ownership

Illustrative issue record / HIGH priority / operational procedure and accountability.

ASSESSMENT JUDGEMENT

Initial alert presentation is evidenced, but the responsible acknowledgement owner is not unambiguous in all fictional records.

EVIDENCE

Observed example

Two of eight controlled records do not demonstrate acknowledgement within the agreed example criterion. A procedural review also identifies that the duty-holder description does not fully address alternate staffing arrangements. The available evidence supports a governance deficiency; it is insufficient to allege poor individual performance.

CONSEQUENCE

Why the issue matters to management

Where the individual responsible for taking ownership is unclear, escalation can become inconsistent and later assurance reviews may not be able to demonstrate that the alert was handled in line with the venue's own operating requirement.

RECOMMENDED CORRECTION

Define and verify ownership

- Nominate the primary acknowledgement function and a documented alternate.
- Update the relevant procedure and briefing material.
- Use a single acknowledgement record in each case file.
- Test the revised process in a controlled, authorised exercise.

ACTION CONTROL

Owner: Security Operations Manager Priority: High
Illustrative window: 0-30 days Verification: revised SOP + training record + repeat evidence review.
Closure criterion: every retest case has a named primary/alternate owner and an unambiguous acknowledgement field.

F-02

DETAILED FINDINGS

Cross-team handover integrity

Illustrative issue record / HIGH priority / evidence continuity and decision traceability.

ASSESSMENT JUDGEMENT

Information exchange occurs, but handover records do not consistently connect the receiving function, decision and case closure.

EVIDENCE

Observed example

In the hypothetical coordination exercise TX-02, notes confirm communication between the control room and response function. The case record lacks a consistent receiver identifier and closure reference. The finding concerns procedural evidence, not the actual ability of a particular security team to respond.

CONSEQUENCE

Why the issue matters

A management team may know that an event was discussed without having a complete, auditable account of the resulting action. This can weaken debriefs, training analysis, incident assurance and contractual reporting.

CORRECTIVE CONTROL

Standardise the handover record

- Agree the minimum information that must travel with each event.
- Record accountable receiving function, decision category and closeout reference.
- Review a sample of completed records during routine quality assurance.
- Include information continuity in the next coordination exercise.

ACTION CONTROL

Owner: Control Room Supervisor Priority: High
Illustrative window: 0-30 days Verification: approved handover template + monitored case sample.
Closure criterion: nominated mandatory handover fields are consistently complete in the agreed retest records.

MEDIUM / LOW FINDINGS

Systemic improvement themes

The remaining issues are grouped by business improvement theme so management can plan coherent work packages.

WORK PACKAGE	ASSOCIATED FINDINGS	SUGGESTED TREATMENT
Document discipline	F-04, F-06, F-08	Update evidence custody, operating procedures and standard closeout structure.
People and learning	F-03, F-05, F-09	Link briefings, periodic exercises and action closure in a controlled learning register.
Leadership oversight	F-07, F-10	Integrate technical exception reporting and trends into a periodic assurance review.

PROGRAMME LOGIC

Why the issues should be grouped

Isolated corrective actions often create extra paperwork without improving the process as a whole. A coherent work package allows the client to assign one accountable sponsor, a common documentation standard and a single verification checkpoint for related issues.

SUCCESS MEASURE

Each work package is closed only when the procedure, training evidence and operational record agree. A document change without a demonstrated working process is not sufficient assurance.

QUALITATIVE RISK MODEL

RISK ASSESSMENT

Prioritising consequence and control weakness

A transparent risk model is used to prioritise management attention. It does not claim to quantify the probability of a real hostile UAV incident.

RISK DIMENSIONS

A proportionate illustrative approach


Consequence

Potential impact on the venue's business, security decisions, auditability and resilience if the process deficiency persists.

Likelihood of process recurrence

Evidence-informed judgement about the recurrence of the documented procedural issue, not a hostile actor's chance of success.

EXAMPLE PRIORITY MATRIX



Priority translation:

Low = routine improvement

Medium = planned corrective action

High = accelerated management action

Critical = urgent executive intervention

IMPORTANT LIMITATION

This is not a certification method

Risk priorities must be agreed with the actual client and recalibrated where site, operating conditions or consequence assumptions differ. Here the model illustrates clear documentation of the assessor's rationale rather than claiming universal security ratings.

RECOMMENDED CONTROLS

RECOMMENDATIONS

Improve the system around the system

The priority is the complete operational chain. Buying new equipment is not assumed to be the first or best response to a process-assurance finding.

PEOPLE

Clarify duty ownership

Name primary and alternate decision owners, and rehearse roles at a defined frequency.

PROCEDURE

Unify case documentation

Adopt a minimum alert, handover and closure record across participating teams.

TECHNICAL GOVERNANCE

Review service exceptions

Create a clear pathway from system maintenance observations to operational owners.

EVIDENCE

Control custody and access

Define evidence index, retention responsibility, review permissions and authorised distribution.

ASSURANCE

Verify correction

Use targeted sample review and repeat exercise evidence to demonstrate effectiveness.

The recommendations are vendor-neutral and aligned to the illustrative findings. Any technical procurement decisions would require a separate operational requirement and suitable procurement assessment.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN

ACTION PLAN

Priority actions / first tranche

Named owners and explicit verification methods translate the findings into a manageable corrective-action programme.

ACTION	CORRECTION	OWNER	WINDOW	VERIFICATION
A-01 / F-01	Define acknowledgement ownership and alternate.	Security Operations	0-30 days	Approved SOP plus exercise record
A-02 / F-02	Use a standard inter-team handover record.	Control Room	0-30 days	Sample completed handover files
A-03 / F-03	Track exercise learning to accountable closure.	Assurance Lead	30-60 days	Action register and signed review
A-04 / F-04	Assign evidence retention and custody roles.	Information Owner	30-60 days	Custody and retention procedure

ASSURANCE GATE

An action is not closed when the policy changes

A corrective action requires an approved change, evidence that affected personnel understand it and a subsequent record

Implementation windows are illustrative and must be adjusted to the real venue's operating risk, event programme and procurement conditions.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN

ACTION PLAN

Planned actions / continuing improvement

The remaining actions support governance, evidence consistency and management assurance over time.

ACTION	CORRECTION	OWNER	WINDOW	VERIFICATION
A-05 / F-05	Align training records to current SOP versions.	Training Lead	30-90 days	Roster and briefing evidence
A-06 / F-06	Introduce formal procedure release and review.	Governance Lead	30-90 days	Change-control register
A-07 / F-07	Link technical exceptions to operational review.	System Owner	30-60 days	Issue and review trail
A-08 / F-08-10	Standardise closeout and quarterly trend reporting.	Security Director	60-90 days	Management report and case sample

PROGRAMME CONTROL

What the monthly review should contain

The client should see overdue actions, completed evidence, unresolved decisions, changing risk, and any dependencies on

The approach supports repeatable assurance; it does not certify that a facility is immune to unauthorised UAV activity.

SAFE SYSTEMS OF WORK

SAFE DELIVERY

Operational safeguards in real delivery

The legitimacy of an assessment depends on its governance as much as the analytical quality of the resulting report.

SSW-01

Authority

Commissioning mandate, written rules of engagement and the lawful basis for each activity.

SSW-02

Aviation

UAS operation matched to appropriate authorisation and applicable airspace limitations.

SSW-03

Site coordination

Named contacts, affected functions and safe operational windows agreed in advance.

SSW-04

Public protection

Risk assessment and operational limitations suitable for the actual venue and activity.

SSW-05

Stop condition

Pre-agreed triggers and named authority to cease or adjust activities.

SSW-06

Evidence protection

Access controls, secure transfer, retention and incident handling procedures.

SEPARATE LEGAL REVIEW

Specialist activity needs specialist permissions

Site-owner approval alone cannot override aviation, telecommunications or other statutory restrictions. A genuine test plan must be reviewed against the latest applicable UK requirements and relevant permissions. No mitigation/effectors are presumed authorised.

ASSURANCE LIFECYCLE

ASSURANCE

From one exercise to sustained readiness

Repeat assurance is valuable only if it verifies the underlying management controls rather than producing a fresh report with no link to previous findings.

01

Baseline

Define the operating requirement and assess the current process.

02

Correct

Implement authorised changes with named accountable owners.

03

Verify

Review documentary evidence and retest the relevant control.

04

Report

Update management decisions, residual risk and completion status.

05

Repeat

Schedule proportionate revalidation after meaningful change.

Retest acceptance: the client agrees the criteria in advance; records demonstrate effectiveness; unresolved limitations and residual risk are explicitly recorded.

OVERALL CONCLUSION

MANAGEMENT CONCLUSION

Independent assurance, decision-ready evidence

A professional report should distinguish what worked, what requires improvement and what was not tested. The public demonstration contains a full synthetic event register and response-governance review.

ILLUSTRATIVE CONCLUSION

Northbridge Arena's hypothetical arrangements show a credible operational baseline. The principal management priority is to make the alert-to-decision pathway consistently attributable, recorded and independently verifiable.

CLIENT VALUE

More than a test result

An independent assurance engagement should give management a structured understanding of existing control strengths, observed process weaknesses, practical changes, accountable owners and a reliable means of verifying improvement. It should also identify what the exercise did not prove.

01
Understand

Clear findings, evidence and confidence limits.

02
Prioritise

Actions linked to consequence and business need.

03
Assure

Documented closure and proportionate retesting.

FINAL QUALIFICATION

Public demonstration

This report is a fictional example of a proposed GDS deliverable. It does not represent a real stadium engagement, a certification, a security guarantee or evidence of specific prior Counter-UAS contract performance by GDS. Real findings would depend on scoped, lawful assessment and verified evidence.

ANNEX A

ANNEX A

Illustrative scenario index

A compact record of the fictional programme, without tactical execution details or protected-site configurations.

REF SERIES	EXERCISE TYPE	ASSESSMENT AREA	OUTPUT
CV-01 / 02	Controlled validation	Alert presentation and traceability	Event records
CV-03 / 04	Controlled validation	Acknowledgement and case ownership	Observer notes
CV-05 / 06	Workflow validation	Case evaluation and decision record	Case log
CV-07 / 08	Workflow validation	Evidence completeness and closeout	Evidence index
TX-01	Tabletop	Command-role understanding	Facilitator log
TX-02	Tabletop	Inter-team coordination	Decision timeline
TX-03	Tabletop	Representative event-day preparedness	Scenario worksheet
TX-04	Tabletop	Debrief and improvement governance	Lessons record

These categories establish what is assessed, not how to conduct a live UAV approach or how to defeat a security device. Real restricted scenario material would be issued only to authorised parties.

ANNEX B

ANNEX B

Evidence register and traceability

A small example demonstrates how an assessment conclusion should be connected to an identifiable, controlled record.

REFERENCE	EVIDENCE CLASS	ASSOCIATED ITEM	STATUS / HANDLING
E-CV-01	Approved exercise event record	Result overview	Demonstration extract
E-CV-02	Acknowledgement review	F-01	Qualified / incomplete sample
E-TX-02	Facilitator observation	F-02	Demonstration extract
E-SOP-01	Procedure review record	F-01, F-06	Version checked
E-CAPA-01	Corrective action tracker	A-01 through A-08	Management register
E-DEB-01	Debrief summary	F-03, F-09	Lessons captured

DATA HANDLING

Controlled distribution is a deliverable requirement

For a real client, the evidence register would identify authorised viewers, original file custody, validity checks, version history and agreed retention. Supporting materials with operational sensitivity would be withheld from public distribution and supplied only through appropriate controlled channels.

ANNEX C

ANNEX C

Glossary, references and limitations

Interpretation notes and public reference sources. These references do not imply endorsement, accreditation or legal approval.

TERMINOLOGY

UAS / UAV	Uncrewed aircraft system / uncrewed aerial vehicle.
C-UAS	Counter-uncrewed aerial systems capability and supporting procedures.
Operational assurance	Evidence-led evaluation of whether defined operating requirements are met.
Red-team exercise	Authorised and governed representative challenge to assess controls and response.
CAPA	Corrective and preventive action management framework.

PUBLIC REFERENCE SOURCES

ProtectUK	Countering threats from Uncrewed Aerial Systems (C-UAS)
NPSA	C-UAS: Making Your Site Ready (public guidance)
UK CAA	UK SORA-based Operational Authorisations

REPORT LIMITATIONS

This document is fictional and is for demonstration of reporting format only. It does not verify a commercial GDS capability, represent the results of actual Counter-UAS testing, establish legal permissions or confirm protection of any venue. Any live engagement requires its own current legal, aviation, safety, data-handling and contractual assessment.

ANNEX D

ANNEX D

Synthetic exercise-event ledger

A client-ready example of traceable performance data. Every row is invented for this demonstration; this is not a real sensor feed, live system log or actual event record.

ALL RESULTS ILLUSTRATIVE

CONTROLLED VALIDATION RECORDS

CASE	CATEGORY	ALERT	ACKNOWLEDGED	DECISION	EVIDENCE
CV-01	Routine controlled	PASS	PASS	COMPLETE	INDEXED
CV-02	Routine controlled	PASS	PASS	COMPLETE	INDEXED
CV-03	Alert handling	PASS	PASS	COMPLETE	INDEXED
CV-04	Alert handling	PASS	NO RECORD	INCOMPLETE	INDEXED
CV-05	Workflow review	PASS	PASS	COMPLETE	INDEXED
CV-06	Workflow review	PASS	PASS	INCOMPLETE	INDEXED
CV-07	Case closure	PASS	NO RECORD	INCOMPLETE	MISSING
CV-08	Case closure	PASS	PASS	COMPLETE	INDEXED

RECONCILIATION

8/8 alerts presented • 6/8 acknowledgement records met the criterion • 5/8 decision records complete • 7/8 evidence packages indexed. These counts reconcile to the management dashboard.

ANNEX E


ANNEX E

Detection versus procedure performance

All values are synthetically generated. They show how a professional report can separate functional alerts from human-process assurance rather than disguising gaps inside a single score.

ALL RESULTS ILLUSTRATIVE

ILLUSTRATIVE CONTROLLED SAMPLE / N = 8



ANALYST INTERPRETATION

The highest-return improvement is procedural

Initial alert presentation is consistently evidenced in the small fictional sample, yet case ownership and decision traceability are incomplete. This justifies targeted procedural controls, not an unsupported claim that physical detection technology should be replaced.

Validity limits: These fractions are sample-completeness measures under imaginary conditions. They are neither real-world detection probabilities nor evidence of the efficacy of any airborne mitigation system. A live engagement would define actual acceptance criteria and confidence limits.

ANNEX F

ANNEX F

Airborne-threat response governance

An illustrative management assessment of the authority, communications and decision framework that would accompany an airborne incident. No live intervention or countermeasure activity is represented.

ALL RESULTS ILLUSTRATIVE

FOUR FICTIONAL COORDINATION EXERCISES

REF	TOPIC	FICTIONAL OBSERVATION	ASSURANCE POSITION
TX-01	Duty authority	Lead function identified; alternate role needs clarification.	Partially evidenced
TX-02	Inter-team handover	Receiving function and closure record not consistently linked.	Improvement required
TX-03	Decision rights	Permitted protective actions discussed; approval record incomplete.	Improvement required
TX-04	Learning / closeout	Debrief completed; owner assigned for next rehearsal.	Good practice with actions

SEPARATE TEST BOUNDARY

Capability not assessed does not mean capability failed

No live airborne interdiction, radio-frequency interference, interception or other physical mitigation was authorised or operated in this fictional example. Therefore, the report makes no claim about the site's capacity to disable, divert or capture a drone in flight. The relevant management finding is the need for clearly documented lawful response options and accountable decision-making.

Commercial value: clients receive an explicit evidence gap, a decision owner and a safe route for further specialist validation where lawfully available.


ANNEX G

ANNEX G

Board-ready risk and control picture

The fictional finding distribution is tied to the ten-item issue register on pages 19-20, with management actions and owners shown on pages 26-27.

FICTIONAL IMPROVEMENT FINDINGS / N = 10



MANAGEMENT DECISION GRID

Direct the investment to evidenced weaknesses

The scenario demonstrates an established alerting workflow and process-related issues in acknowledgement ownership, handover records and assessment closure. The proportional response is management accountability, targeted training and verified procedural improvement.

01
Preserve

Maintain observed good-practice controls.

02
Correct

Close high-priority evidence and ownership gaps.

03
Verify

Retest against agreed, recorded success criteria.